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LAWYERS AS THE POLICE OF THEIR OWN PROFESSION:
RULE 8.3 AND THE DUTY TO REPORT
PAUL F. RICHARD*
The duty of a lawyer to report certain professional misconduct
of another attorney or judge is an integral part of the obligation of
every licensed attorney to police the profession. Since the publica-
tion of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in In re Himmel,'
there has been an increased interest in the extent of the obligation
imposed by Rule 8.3. The following discussion will examine Rule
8.3 and discuss the dilemma experienced by lawyers when faced
with another lawyer's or judge's misconduct.
I. WHAT DOES RULE 8.3 REQUIRE?
Rule 8.3 imposes upon each attorney and judge the obligation
to police their own profession. The obligation imposed by Rule 8.3
should be viewed as being no different than the obligation of the
profession to assure that individuals admitted to practice law in
the State of North Dakota are competent and meet basic mini-
mum requirements for admission to practice. Through the Admis-
sion to Practice Rules, it is lawyers and judges who determine
which individuals will be permitted to practice law in the State.
Through the admission process, the profession strives to determine
which individuals will practice law ethically and competently.
Just like any other initial interview or assessment process, the
procedures and protections afforded by the Admission to Practice
Rules cannot protect the public from unethical or incompetent
attorneys after admission to the Bar. The North Dakota Rules of
Professional Conduct guide attorneys with respect to their ethical
obligations once they are admitted to practice law in the State.
Once an individual is admitted to practice, Rule 8.3 picks up
where the Admission to Practice Rules leave off. That is, just as
attorneys are involved in the assessment of the new lawyer prior
to admission, Rule 8.3 imposes upon each licensed attorney and
judge the obligation to police the profession and assure that indi-
viduals licensed to practice law continue to adhere to the require-
* Partner in the law firm of Serkland, Lundberg, Erickson, Marcil & McLean, Ltd.,
Fargo, North Dakota; J.D., 1979, University of North Dakota; Member of the State Bar
Association of North Dakota Ethics Committee, 1986 to present (Chairman 1989 to
present). Opinions expressed are his own and not necessarily those of the Ethics
Committee or individual members thereof.
1. 125 IUI. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
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ments of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 8.3 provides as
follows:
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of these Rules that raises a substan-
tial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness,
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall initiate pro-
ceedings under the North Dakota Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure.
(b) A lawyer having knowledge that a judge has commit-
ted a violation of the North Dakota Rules of Judicial Con-
duct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness for judicial office in
other respects shall initiate proceedings under the Rules
of the North Dakota Judicial Conduct Commission.
(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of information
protected by Rule 1.6.'
The term "knowledge," as used in Rule 8.3, denotes actual knowl-
edge of the fact in question.3 The Rules of Professional Conduct
provide that a person's "knowledge" may be inferred from the
person's conduct under the circumstances.4 The duty to report a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct under Rule 8.3 may
be applicable to an isolated violation of the Rules. Reporting is
particularly important in situations where the victim of the mis-
conduct is unlikely to discover the offense.'
It is important to recognize that Rule 8.3 does not require the
reporting of every violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
which a lawyer has knowledge. Rule 8.3 requires a lawyer to exer-
cise independent judgment in each situation for purposes of mak-
ing a determination of whether or not a known violation must be
reported. Once a lawyer has actual knowledge of a violation by
another lawyer of the Rules of Professional Conduct or a violation
by a judge of the North Dakota Rules of Judicial Conduct, the law-
yer must exercise independent judgment as to whether the viola-
tion raises a "substantial question" as to that person's "honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness" as a lawyer or judge. As noted in the
comments to Rule 8.3, the issue of "[w]hether a violation is 'sub-
stantial' depends on the seriousness of the possible offense and not
2. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1990).
3. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1990).
4. Id.
5. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 comment (1990).
374 [Vol. 67:373
LAWYERS AND DUTY TO REPORT
the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. ",6 The obli-
gation to report a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
under Rule 8.3 is limited "to those offenses that a self-regulating
profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent."'
Once a lawyer determines that another lawyer or judge has
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct or the North Dakota
Rules of Judicial Conduct within the meaning of Rule 8.3, the law-
yer must also determine whether the reporting of the violation is
excused under Rule 8.3(c). The reporting requirement under Rule
8.3 is limited by the Rule 1.6 requirement that a lawyer not reveal
or use information to the disadvantage of a client, except when
required or permitted by Rule 1.6.8 The Ethics Committee for the
State Bar Association of North Dakota has noted that:
'The reporting obligation of MR 8.3(a) is narrower than
the Code's D.R. 1-103(A) in one material way. The confi-
dentiality rule extends to all "information relating to rep-
resentation of a client," the only relevant exception being
that for "disclosures impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation." Thus, reporting is foreclosed if it would
entail revelation of any client information, whether or not
the revelation would prejudice a client's interests.
Reporting under Rule 8.3(a), therefore, is required only
when (1) to do so would affirmatively advance a client's
interest; or (2) reporting would not involve revelation of
any information relating to the representation of a
client.'9
Of course, disclosure of client information is permitted if the client
consents. 10 As noted in the comments to Rule 8.3, if a lawyer is
excused from reporting a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct on the basis of Rule 1.6, the lawyer "should encourage
the client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not
substantially prejudice the client's interests.' Once the lawyer
having knowledge of the violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or the North Dakota Rules of Judicial Conduct has made
the determination that the violation constitutes a reportable event
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1990).
9. State Bar Association of North Dakota (SBAND) Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. 42 (1990) (quoting C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 685 (1986) and State
Bar of Wisconsin Op. E-89-12).
10. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1990).
11. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 comment (1990).
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and is not excused, the Rule does not appear to permit the lawyer
to postpone the reporting.
12
II. IS THE FAILURE TO REPORT AN EVENT THAT
WOULD BE CONSIDERED REPORTABLE UNDER
RULE 8.3 A BASIS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION
AGAINST THE NONREPORTING ATTORNEY OR
JUDGE?
An additional dilemma faced by lawyers or judges who have
knowledge of a reportable violation under Rule 8.3, and who are
not excused from reporting the violation under Rule 1.6, is the
issue of whether their failure to make the report may serve as a
basis for disciplinary action against them. During their careers,
some practicing lawyers or judges will be faced with an issue of
whether there is an obligation to report another lawyer's or
judge's misconduct. As in any situation, there is a wide spectrum
of possible scenarios that might be reportable under Rule 8.3. On
the one end of the spectrum will be violations that any lawyer or
judge would clearly conclude to be reportable under the Rule
(e.g., theft of client funds). On the other end will be those viola-
tions for which there is no obligation to report. Unfortunately,
there are a large number of violations that will fall in the middle.
As indicated, each situation will have to be independently assessed
by the lawyer or judge, and a judgment call made as to whether
the situation falls within the reach of those violations that are
reportable under the Rule.
When a lawyer or judge makes the determination that a viola-
tion is reportable under Rule 8.3, does he or she face the possibility
of a disciplinary action for failure to make a report? Probably the
most publicized case on this point is In re Himmel. 3 Himmel
involved a situation in which James H. Himmel, a lawyer licensed
in Illinois, was suspended from practice for one year by the Illinois
Supreme Court for failing to report another attorney's
misconduct. 
14
Although Himmel argued that he was excused from reporting
the attorney's misconduct because his client had done so, the court
concluded that Himmel's obligation to report could not be excused
on the basis that his client had made a report.'5 In addition, the
12. SBAND Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 42 (1990).
13. 125 III. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
14. In re Himmel, 125 IU. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
15. Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 792.
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court analyzed the information and the circumstances surround-
ing the failure to report the former attorney's misconduct and con-
cluded that the failure to report was not excused on the basis that
the information was privileged.' Thus, the Himmel court recog-
nized that the duty to report is excused in situations where it
would require disclosure of privileged information.
The Himmel court went on to conclude that, in light of the
fact that Himmel possessed unprivileged knowledge of the former
attorney's conversion of client funds, which is a reportable viola-
tion of the Rules, the failure to report such misconduct was itself a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a recent
case, the Appellate Court of Illinois cited Himmel and went on to
state the following with respect to the obligation of lawyers to
police the profession:
'Lawyers also must assist in the policing of lawyer miscon-
duct. The vigilance of the bar in preventing and, where
required, reporting misconduct can be a formidable
deterrent to such misconduct, and a key to maintaining
public confidence in the integrity of the profession as a
whole in the face of the egregious misconduct of a few." 7
It is uncertain whether Himmel would be followed by the
North Dakota Supreme Court if the same situation arose in this
state. The case, however, does demonstrate a situation in which
an attorney with knowledge of what most lawyers would consider
to be a clear violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct which
raises a substantial question as to the violating attorney's honesty,
trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer, failed to report the mis-
conduct and then faced disciplinary action for his failure to abide
by the duty to report obligation.
It is important to note that Himmel involved the interpreta-
tion of the Illinois Ethics Code. This code was modeled after the
ABA's former Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
had broad requirements for the reporting of misconduct of other
lawyers in cases where the information was unprivileged. Under
the newer ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, after which
the North Dakota Rules are patterned, a lawyer is required to
report misconduct of other lawyers which "raises substantial ques-
tions as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness and is
16. Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 792-95.
17. Weber v. Cueto, 209 I11. App. 3d 936, -, 568 N.E.2d 513, 518 (1991) (quoting ILL.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990)).
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not protected by Rule 1.6."18 Despite the difference between the
Rule and the Model Code, however, it would seem that the theft
of client funds would be reportable under both the Rules and the
Model Code.
The Himmel case demonstrates what could happen in a situa-
tion in which an attorney fails to report another attorney's viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Clearly, the disciplinary
action taken against the nonreporting attorney will be dependent
upon the circumstances of each case. It would seem that the sus-
pension from practice for one year was a rather harsh punishment
for Himmel's failure to report under the facts of the case. In any
event, Himmel serves as a reminder to North Dakota practicing
attorneys of their obligations under the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
III. DOES SELF-REGULATION WORK?
Following the Himmel decision, Illinois lawyers scrambled to
report the misdeeds of their fellow lawyers. In the five months
after Himmel was suspended, the Illinois Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission received 331 complaints under the
"whistle-blowing rule."' 9 Obviously, the Himmel decision shook
up the Illinois Bar. In North Dakota, the percentage of discipli-
nary complaints filed by attorneys and judges, compared to com-
plaints from nonlawyers and judges, is relatively low. In 1989,
approximately 18 out of 114 complaints were fied by lawyers or
judges, and in 1990 the number was approximately 8 out of 150
complaints. 20 Presumably, most North Dakota lawyers would not
have difficulty making a report if the violation by another attorney
clearly fell within the reach of Rule 8.3. Such self-regulation is
clearly important to the promotion of the ethics of the profession,
and lawyers are in the best position to assess whether the conduct
of another attorney or judge fails to meet the expectations of the
profession.
The more difficult case arises in those situations in which an
attorney must determine whether or not another lawyer is provid-
ing "competent representation to a client." Rule 1.1 of the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct indicates that competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
18. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 8.3 (1989).
19. Marcotte, The Duty to Inform, ABA JOURNAL, May 1989, at 17-18.
20. Letter from Vivian Berg, Disciplinary Counsel, Disciplinary Board of the North
Dakota Supreme Court (April 15, 1991).
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and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation
undertaken by the lawyer.2 ' The comments to Rule 1.1 indicate
that "[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry
into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem,
and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of com-
petent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. '2 2 It
is difficult to determine whether disciplinary proceedings should
be commenced against another lawyer due to his or her lack of
preparation. The lawyer may have specific knowledge of an inci-
dent or general knowledge through other lawyers or judges that a
particular attorney routinely fails to make an adequate inquiry
into or analysis of the factual and legal elements of a problem and
generally lacks adequate preparation for the cases he or she under-
takes. At what point another attorney's repeated lack of prepara-
tion becomes reportable under Rule 8.3 is a difficult question to
answer.
Do lawyers or judges in North Dakota have an obligation to
report such lack of preparation? Clearly, if the repeated lack of
preparation raises a substantial question as to the fitness of the law-
yer to practice law, it is reportable under Rule 8.3. Rule 8.3 is
designed to protect the public from lawyers and judges whose
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness is in question. Presumably, at
some point the knowledge possessed by lawyers or judges regard-
ing another attorney's lack of preparation and competence, as
defined by the Rules of Professional Conduct, must be reported if
the purpose of the Rule is to be accomplished. For that matter,
lawyers and judges are in the best position to make the assessment
of whether or not another lawyer practices law competently.
Another dilemma facing attorneys and judges under Rule 8.3
is the conflict between the obligation of attorneys to report judges
and the obligation of judges to report attorneys. This situation
would most often arise in specific cases pending before a judge in
which either the attorney believes the presiding judge has violated
the North Dakota Rules of Judicial Conduct, or the judge believes
the attorney has violated the North Dakota Rules of Professional
Conduct. Unless the reporting is excused under Rule 1.6, the
knowledge of a reportable violation, as outlined in Rule 8.3, may
have a significant impact on the progress of the case. Rule 8.3 does
not indicate that the required report is to be made only after the
case is completed. Once it has been determined that a violation is
21. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1990).
22. N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 comment (1990).
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reportable under Rule 8.3, it would appear that the lawyer or
judge may not postpone the reporting.
There probably is no truly accurate method to measure
whether or not the Rule 8.3 duty to report works to control lawyer
or judicial misconduct. Of course, Rule 8.3 is not the only method
by which lawyer or judicial misconduct is reported. It would seem
that the obligations imposed by Rule 8.3, when considered with
the other methods by which lawyer and judicial misconduct are
reported, should work as a system. It is natural for individuals to
be reluctant to take the step of reporting because of the conse-
quences that may flow from such reporting. On the other hand,
Rule 8.3 does not appear to allow lawyers or judges who are aware
of reportable misconduct to put their heads in the sand and let
someone else deal with the problem. Thus, it is difficult to find any
true measure of whether or not Rule 8.3 works. Yet, as an integral
part of the entire lawyer and judicial disciplinary process, Rule 8.3
cannot be ignored.
IV. CONCLUSION
The utilization of self-regulation through Rule 8.3, in conjunc-
tion with other methods available for attorney and judicial disci-
pline, works to enhance the legal profession in this state. The
Rules of Professional Conduct, in conjunction with the Code of
Judicial Conduct, continuing education requirements, Admission
to Practice Rules, and the North Dakota lawyer disciplinary pro-
cess, work to assure the competence and the ethics of the legal
profession in the state. We all have an obligation to police the pro-
fession. The duty under Rule 8.3 is not new and is certainly a
palatable alternative to nonlawyer regulation of the profession.
Rule 8.3 is not an unyielding standard; it gives each lawyer latitude
to exercise independent judgment in each situation and recog-
nizes that the client's interest must be considered before any
report is made. On the other hand, in the appropriate situation,
every licensed attorney must be willing to accept the responsibil-
ity defined by Rule 8.3, so as to promote the ethics of the profes-
sion and protect the public.
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